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1. INTRODUCTION 
Legal rules play a vital role in the functioning of societies. Across all walks of life, laws regulate 
and constrain social behaviors, from the taxes individuals pay to governments, to the way they 
treat employees at work, or the sexual acts they engage in at home. However, an emerging 
literature in behavioral economics shows that many behaviors are also influenced by informal 
rules of conduct that define what society perceives as socially appropriate or inappropriate. 
Unlike laws, these social norms are not formally codified or sustained by extrinsic 
reinforcements such as material penalties or fines, yet they are commonly recognized within a 
given society and informally enforced by means of social sanctions and rewards. Recent research 
has shown that norms are an essential component of many of the social behaviors that are also 
regulated by law, such as the untruthful reporting of private information (e.g., Gneezy et al., 
2018; Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg, 2018; Abeler et al., 2019; Garbarino et al., 2019), tax 
evasion (e.g., Lefebvre et al., 2015; Dwenger et al., 2016), bribery and corruption (e.g., Fisman 
and Miguel, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2019), or the expression of discriminatory behaviors or 
opinions (e.g., Barr et al., 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2019). 
What is the relationship between these two institutions – law and norms -, that frequently 
regulate very similar types of behavior? Do they have independent influence on behavior, one by 
means of the deterrent power of incentives, the other by the power of social pressure? Or are 
there interdependencies in the influence they exert on social behavior? And, more specifically, 
can lawmakers use the law to affect behavior, not just through the deterring power of incentives, 
but also through what has been labeled in the literature as the expressive function of law 
(Sunstein, 1996), i.e., by shaping the underlying social norms of a society? 
This paper is the first to present clean empirical evidence on the causal influence of law on 
social norms. While this question has attracted the interest of many researchers from multiple 
disciplines in the last two decades, and a plethora of theoretical mechanisms have been proposed 
to explain how law may shape norms, the empirical evidence remains scant. This is mainly 
because the identification of the causal effects of law on norms presents a number of substantive 
challenges to empirical research. 
First, for many years social scientists have been struggling to translate the concept of social 
norm into a measurable construct that can be used in empirical analysis. For this reason, previous 
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empirical research has been limited to studying the influence of legal rules either on behavior – 
arguing that the observed effects cannot be merely explained by deterrence and thus providing 
indirect evidence for the influence of law on norms (e.g., Funk, 2007) -, or on personal opinions 
(Chen and Yeh, 2014) – a construct that is related to, but quite distinct from, social norms. In this 
paper, we exploit a recent advancement in empirical research on social norms (Krupka and 
Weber, 2013), and design a series of vignette experiments that allow us to measure, directly and 
in an incentive-compatible way, the social norms pertaining to a variety of social behaviors. 
Through these measurements, we can observe, for the first time, the influence that law exerts 
directly on norms. 
A second, pervasive challenge faced by empirical research in this area concerns the 
difficulty in establishing a clear direction of causality in the relationship between law and social 
norms. This is because law and norms co-evolve: they can influence one another and are often 
simultaneously co-determined by external factors, such as the availability of factual information 
about the harms of certain behaviors. In this paper, we overcome this identification problem by 
exploiting a special subclass of laws that regulate behavior by means of legal thresholds defining 
the cut-off point above (or below) which a certain behavior becomes illegal (e.g., speed limit 
laws; age of consent laws; etc.). We argue that it is reasonable to assume that, if a social norm 
exists that governs the same behavior also regulated by a legal threshold, this norm, absent the 
law, would not make sharp distinctions between behaviors that are arbitrarily close to the 
threshold (e.g., driving at 69mph or 71mph on a road with a 70mph speed limit), since these 
behaviors are virtually identical to each other in all respects except for their legal status. Thus, if 
we observe a discrete change in the perceived social appropriateness of behaviors that are just on 
either side of a legal threshold, we can causally attribute this difference to the influence of law.1 
                                           
1 Direction of causality can also be readily established in the context of laboratory experiments, where the researcher 
tightly controls the decision environment and can introduce exogenous changes in the “rules” that govern behavior 
in the lab. A number of papers have studied the effects of such “lab laws” using experimental games. These studies 
show that requirements about specific actions mandated by the experimenter (for instance, a minimum contribution 
level in a public goods game, or a minimum admissible wage in a gift-exchange game) can affect behavior even if 
they are supported by weak, non-deterrent sanctions, and that the effect can last even after the requirement has been 
lifted (e.g., Falk et al., 2006; Galbiati and Vertova, 2008; 2014; Riedel and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2013; d’Adda et al., 
2017; Barron and Nurminen, 2018; Engl et al., 2018). Differently from these studies, our paper does not focus on lab 
laws, but on the effects of laws that regulate behavior outside the lab. This circumvents the issue of external validity 
that is sometimes raised for experiments that focus on how individuals respond to the legal environment (e.g., 
Kelman, 1985; Arlen and Talley, 2008). 
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In our vignette experiments, we asked subjects to evaluate the social appropriateness of 
various behaviors that are regulated by legal thresholds. We consider five types of legal 
thresholds, pertaining to: sexual activity with minors, the sale of alcohol to minors, undeclared 
cash imports into a country, drink driving, and speeding. Across several treatments, we present 
subjects with slightly modified versions of the vignettes where we describe behavior that is either 
legal or illegal, and either closer or further away from the legal threshold (for example, selling 
alcohol to a youth who is 1, 2, 3 or 4 months below or above the legal drinking age). In each 
case, we use the experimental technique pioneered by Krupka and Weber (2013) to measure the 
social norm pertaining to the behavior described in the vignette, and thus elicit a “normative 
function” that expresses the social appropriateness of behavior as a function of age, cash amount 
imported, blood alcohol content or speed, depending on the type of vignette.  
We argue that the expressive effect of law on the norm associated with a certain behavior 
can be identified by testing for the presence of a discontinuity in the corresponding normative 
function at the legal threshold. As discussed above, we think that it is unlikely that the function, 
absent the law, would be discontinuous at the threshold since behaviors near, but on opposite 
sides of the threshold are virtually indistinguishable from one another. Thus, the presence of a 
discontinuity in the normative function at the threshold is likely to be caused by the existence of 
a law that assigns legal or illegal status to those behaviors. 
We ran the experiments with more than 800 subjects drawn from two student samples, one 
in the UK and one in China, and one sample that is representative of the UK general population 
in terms of gender, age and personal income. In all samples, we find clear evidence of marked 
discontinuities in the normative functions at the legal thresholds. However, we also observe 
differences in the expressive power of law across the five types of behavior we consider. In 
particular, in both UK samples we find strong effects of law on norms associated with having 
sexual relations with minors, selling alcohol to minors, and importing undeclared cash amounts 
into a country. We find instead weaker or no effects in the case of laws regulating drink driving 
and speeding behavior. We provide suggestive evidence that these heterogeneous effects are 
related to differences across the five domains of law in perceptions of the intentionality of illegal 
behavior and ability of law enforcement to detect it.  
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Our paper contributes to the interdisciplinary literature on the expressive function of law. 
Most of this literature (reviewed in section 2 below) is theoretical or conceptual, and there are 
only few empirical studies that provide evidence for the causal influence of law on norms.2 
However, these studies typically show that the law has effects on behavior that transcends the 
mere deterrent power of incentives, but cannot show that these effects are actually mediated by 
shifts in the underlying social norms that are associated with those behaviors. Our paper 
complements this existing work by providing first-hand empirical evidence that legal rules have 
the power to shape normative intuitions about the behaviors that they regulate. 
Our results provide evidence in favor of a specific mechanism behind this effect: the 
signaling theory proposed by Posner (1998; 2000; 2002). This theory contends that, when a law 
succeeds in creating separation in the types of individuals who do or do not comply with the legal 
rule, illegal behavior becomes socially stigmatized because of the signal it sends about the 
characteristics of those engaging in it. This allows for the possibility of variation in the 
expressive power of different laws depending on the informativeness of the signal conveyed by 
illegal behavior about a person’s type. Our data is consistent with this: we observe that the 
strength of the effect of law on norms varies across legal settings and is correlated with the 
perceived intentionality and detectability of illegal behavior – two factors that are likely to affect 
the inferences one can make about the characteristics of those who engage in legal or illegal 
behavior. Thus, our results contain an important message for public policy design: laws can be 
made more effective, by better harnessing the power of social norms, if they can send a stronger 
signal about the transgressor. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the conceptual 
framework and identification strategy used in our study. Section 3 describes the experimental 
design. Section 4 presents the results of the experiment, and section 5 concludes. 
                                           
2 We are aware of three empirical studies. Funk (2007) shows that the abolition of the legal duty to vote in 4 Swiss 
Cantons had a detrimental effect on voter turnouts, which is unlikely to be due to (lack of) deterrence since fines for 
not voting were very low (less than $1 in most cases). Wittlin (2011) shows that differences in seatbelt use across US 
states cannot be solely explained by state-level variations in penalties for not wearing a seatbelt, and that the 
enactment of a seatbelt law in one state has spillover effects on neighboring states. Rees-Jones and Rozema (2019) 
show that the effects of changes in the US cigarette tax law are mediated by the intensity of media coverage, 
lobbying efforts, and other activities related to the lawmaking process. 
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Tracing back to David Hume (1740), the study of social norms has a long tradition in the social 
sciences (e.g., Durkheim, 1895; Parsons, 1937; Lewis, 1969; Sugden, 1986; 1989; Elster, 1989; 
Cialdini et al., 1990; Coleman, 1990; Pettit, 1990; Ellickson, 1991; Bicchieri, 1993; McAdams, 
1997; Posner, 1997; Ostrom, 2000). It is only recently, however, that this body of research has 
started to converge on a shared paradigm to define norms and explain their influence on 
behavior. One point of common ground among several authors is the notion that humans 
naturally strive to obtain approval and avoid disapproval from others (e.g., Smith, 1759; 
McAdams, 1997; Sugden, 1998a; 2000; Brennan and Pettit, 2004; Bicchieri, 2006; 2017; Fehr 
and Schurtenberger, 2018; see Ruff et al., 2013 and Strang et al., 2015 for evidence on the neural 
basis of this desire for approval). This implies that individuals’ willingness to undertake certain 
behaviors partly depends on the extent to which those behaviors are approved by the members of 
one’s reference network. Social behavior is thus inherently dependent on expectations about what 
others think that one ought to do. Within this framework, social norms are rules of conduct that 
embody these expectations and define what is collectively perceived as appropriate behavior in a 
given decision situation by a specific group of individuals.  
In economics, the notion of norm has been frequently used in the tradition of Lewis (1969), 
i.e. as a solution to pure-coordination problems with multiple equilibria (e.g., Young, 1993; 
1996). But more recent approaches have also proposed models where agents strive to conform to 
others’ expectations and are stigmatized for deviations from what is perceived to be appropriate 
or customary behavior (e.g., Bernheim, 1994; Lindbeck et al., 1999; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; 
López-Pérez, 2008; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Krupka and Weber, 2013; d’Adda et al., 
2019). A growing empirical literature has provided increasing support to the mechanisms 
proposed in these models, across a variety of decision settings (see, e.g., Gächter et al., 2013; 
Krupka and Weber, 2013; Schram and Charness, 2015; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; 
Gächter et al., 2017; Krupka et al., 2017; Barr et al., 2018; Chang et al., 2019). 
In this paper, we follow the approach by Krupka and Weber (2013), and operationalize 
norms as rules that define the social appropriateness of the actions available to an agent. More 
precisely, we assume that the agent’s utility from choosing action 𝑎𝑖 is given by: 
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𝑈𝑖(𝑎𝑖) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑎𝑖) + 𝛾𝑖𝑁(𝑎𝑖)     (1) 
where 𝑉𝑖(𝑎𝑖) describes the agent’s utility over own material payoffs and 𝛾𝑖𝑁(𝑎𝑖) captures utility 
from norm compliance. This second term is defined by an individual-specific parameter 𝛾𝑖, 
which describes the importance of the norm-compliance motive for agent 𝑖, and a norm function 
𝑁(. ), which assigns a value of social appropriateness to each action 𝑎𝑖 available to the agent. 
Krupka and Weber (2013) have shown, and subsequent studies (e.g., Gächter et al., 2017; Barr et 
al., 2018; Chang et al., 2019) confirmed, the usefulness of thinking about norms as functions that 
define the appropriateness of all possible actions available to 𝑖, as opposed to prescriptions of the 
most appropriate action that an agent ought to take. This makes it possible to capture subtle 
differences between the norms regulating a particular type of behavior in different situations or 
societies; for instance, different norms may agree upon which action is the behavior one ought to 
undertake, but differ substantially in the extent to which they stigmatize deviations from this 
most appropriate action. 
In this framework, actions are more likely to be taken if they provide the agent higher 
material payoffs, and if they are more socially appropriate. Within this setup, a formal law, 
created and enforced through governmental institutions, can influence behavior in, potentially, 
two ways. First, it can alter the material payoffs the agent expects to receive from certain actions 
– for instance, if the government makes a particular action illegal and subjects it to a fine, the 
expected material payoff from this action is reduced by the size of the fine weighted by the 
probability of it being imposed. This is the traditional economics approach to rationalize the 
deterrent effect of law on behavior (see, e.g., Becker, 1968). Secondly, the law may exert an 
effect on the norm function 𝑁(. ) applying to that same behavior. This we can think of as the 
expressive power of law. A number of different mechanisms have been proposed in the literature 
to explain the source of this power. These fall broadly into three categories: (i) information 
transmission; (ii) the existence of a meta-norm of legal obedience; and (iii) the use of law 
compliance as a signal of one’s trustworthiness. 
The first class of mechanisms proposes that the law can act as a public signal containing 
crucial information that citizens use to update their beliefs about relevant features of the decision 
environment. McAdams (2000; 2015), for instance, argues that, particularly in democratic 
societies, the law conveys information about what most people in a society approve or 
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disapprove of. This can have a direct impact on norms, especially in situations where individuals 
may be ex-ante unsure about what others find appropriate or inappropriate – i.e. there is 
uncertainty about the shape of the norm function 𝑁(. ).3 In these cases, factors, such as laws, that 
aggregate information about what individuals actually think (or are at least positively correlated 
with it) may lead to profound changes in the perception of what is socially accepted. Relatedly, 
several authors have proposed models where lawmakers have private information about some 
key features of the decision environment (for instance, the prevailing standards of behavior; or 
the distribution of agents’ preferences), and use the law – and the formal incentives that 
accompany it – to signal it to the agents (see, e.g., Kahan, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; van 
der Weele, 2012; Bursztyn et al., 2019).4 
According to the second type of mechanism, discussed in Cooter (1998; 2000) and 
McAdams and Rasmusen (2007), individuals may comply with a norm of legal obedience 
whereby they feel obliged to follow the law and therefore automatically consider as appropriate 
the behaviors that are legal and as inappropriate those that are illegal. McAdams and Rasmusen 
(2007, p. 1591) argue that this effect may be “…particularly important for offenses that are 
malum in prohibitum – wrong only because illegal – because the prohibited act is not itself 
governed by a norm and the only relevant norm is legal obedience.”. Thus, according to this 
account, the law can shape (or indeed create) the norm function 𝑁(. ) that regulates a specific 
behavior, but only because individuals follow a meta-norm that prescribes that one ought to 
respect the law. 
Finally, Eric Posner (1998; 2000; 2002) proposes a third type of mechanism according to 
which individuals may use compliance with the law as a means to signal to others that they are 
trustworthy partners in informal exchanges.5 When the signal is informative, and trustworthy 
individuals successfully separate from untrustworthy ones, illegal behavior becomes stigmatized 
because those who engage in such behavior are shunned and avoided by society. The law gives 
                                           
3 A classic example of misperceived social norms are situations of “pluralistic ignorance”, whereby individuals do 
not personally stigmatize a certain behavior, but falsely believe that most others do. See Bursztyn et al. (2018) for an 
example of pluralistic ignorance in the context of attitudes towards female labor force participation in Saudi Arabia. 
4 See Galbiati et al. (2013) and Danilov and Sliwka (2016) for experimental evidence, and Sliwka (2007) for a 
related model applied to workplace relations. 
5 In Posner’s model a “trustworthy agent” has a low discount rate that allows them to sustain the benefits of long-run 
cooperation and forgo the immediate gains of defection. Agents use features of social life, such as law compliance, 
to signal to others their own discount rate. 
8 
 
thus rise to a social norm against this behavior: it is disapproved of, not directly because of the 
behavior’s consequences, but because of the type of person it is associated with. However, this 
may not always be the case. Depending on a number of circumstances, including the incentives 
used to enforce the law or the ability of law enforcement to monitor behavior, individuals may or 
may not succeed in signaling their type through law compliance. When they do not succeed and 
both trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals pool on the same behavior, there is no stigma 
associated with illegal behavior and no norm against this behavior. Thus, according to Posner, 
whether the law has expressive power depends on the extent to which it succeeds in favoring the 
emergence of a separating equilibrium that creates a norm 𝑁(. ) stigmatizing illegal behavior. 
While the literature discussed so far proposes mechanisms through which the law can exert 
an influence on social norms, several authors have highlighted the fact that the influence must 
also run in the opposite direction. Norms do sometimes precede the law and lead to its creation 
(see, e.g., Posner, 1997; Chen and Yeh, 2013). Indeed, some authors have argued that the law’s 
reflection of the normative intuition of the community that it regulates is essential to guarantee its 
effectiveness (e.g., Robinson, 2000; Stuntz, 2000; Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017). More 
generally, law and norms co-evolve, they may influence each other, and they can both be 
independently affected by external factors, such as factual information about the risks and 
dangers of certain behaviors, which may stimulate simultaneous changes in both law and norms. 
This highlights one of the crucial challenges faced by empirical research in this area – the 
difficulty in devising an identification strategy that allows overcoming the problem of reverse 
causality. Indeed, this also explains why empirical research is relatively scarce, especially if 
compared to the wealth of theoretical work that has been done on this topic. 
In this paper, we propose a novel empirical strategy that, we argue, allows to cleanly 
identify the effect of laws on norms, using reasonably mild assumptions to resolve the issue of 
reverse causality. In particular, we focus on a special subset of laws that regulate behavior by 
means of legal thresholds that set a cutoff value to distinguish between legal and illegal actions. 
For instance, laws that establish the maximum speed at which one is allowed to drive on a given 
road. While it is difficult to defend the assumption that the enactment of a speeding law, or 
changes in the existing law, are independent from pre-existing normative considerations about 
the appropriateness of driving at high speed, we argue that a less demanding assumption is that 
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such a norm is unlikely to make a priori sharp distinctions between behaviors that are in all 
respects very similar to each other. For instance, in the absence of any pre-existing speed limit, it 
is unlikely that a norm would sharply distinguish between driving at 69mph instead of 71mph on 
a motorway such that this would inform the lawmaker’s decision to position the legal threshold at 
70mph. If this assumption is valid, one can then consider the existence of a sharp discontinuity in 
the underlying norm exactly at the speed of 70mph on motorways as causally determined by the 
existence of a legal limit at that speed. 
Our reasoning here is similar to the arguments used to support the local randomization 
assumption in regression discontinuity designs. As in those designs, we are assuming that the 
“outcome” variable – in our case, the normative function 𝑁(. ) – would be continuous in the 
vicinity of the legal threshold, absent an expressive power of the law. If so, we can identify the 
causal effect of the law on norms by testing for a discontinuity in 𝑁(. ) measured at the behavior 
that coincides with the legal threshold.6 
More precisely, in our experiment we will use an incentivized norm-elicitation procedure, 
described below, to measure the social appropriateness of a series of actions that vary in the 
distance from a legal threshold (for instance, the appropriateness of driving at 67mph, 69mph, 
71mph or 73mph on a road where the limit is 70mph). We use the measurements of 
appropriateness for actions that fall below the legal threshold 𝑇 to estimate the norm function for 
legal actions, 𝑁𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙(𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖 < 𝑇), while we use the measurements of appropriateness for actions 
that exceed the threshold to estimate the function 𝑁𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙(𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖 > 𝑇). Under the assumption that 
these functions are continuous in 𝑎𝑖 around the threshold 𝑇, we identify the causal effect of the 
law on the social norm by estimating: 
(𝑁𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 − 𝑁𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙|𝑎𝑖 = 𝑇) = lim
𝜀↓0
[𝑁𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙|𝑎𝑖 = 𝑇 + 𝜖] − lim
𝜀↑0
[𝑁𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙|𝑎𝑖 = 𝑇 + 𝜖] (2) 
Note that our identification strategy and its underlying assumptions have bearings for the 
type of mechanisms that we may be able to isolate with our study. In particular, our key 
assumption is that any characteristic of behavior, apart from its legality, that may underlie the 
                                           
6 One difference between our design and regression discontinuity designs is that, as we explain in the next section, 
we obtain measurements of the outcome variable 𝑁(. ) from individuals who are randomly assigned (by us) to either 
side of the legal threshold. Thus, we do not have to worry about potential manipulations of the “assignment” variable 
on the part of subjects, which is instead a main concern in regression discontinuity designs. 
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normative function 𝑁(. ) does not vary sharply between actions just on either side of the legal 
threshold. For instance, if 𝑁(. ) is also a function of the potential social harms that result directly 
from engaging in a certain behavior, we assume that there are no sharp differences in the 
perceptions of such harms between actions that are just legal or just illegal. As such, a rational 
individual should not use legality as an informative public signal about these other characteristics 
of the behavior regulated by the threshold. This arguably makes information transmission an 
unlikely explanation for any effect that we may be able to identify with our design.  
On the other hand, our design can pick up effects of the law on norms that are either due to 
a meta-norm of legal obedience, or to the mechanism proposed by Eric Posner, whereby laws 
affect norms when legal compliance serves as a separating signal of one’s trustworthiness. While 
our experiment is not specifically designed to disentangle between these two explanations, a 
possible difference is that the meta-norm mechanism implies that the expressive power of law 
holds regardless of the specific domains which the law is applied to, whereas, in Posner’s 
mechanism the ability of the law to affect norms is inherently context-dependent. 
3. EXPERIMENT 
3.1 Experimental Design 
Our experiment is designed to measure the effect an action’s legality has on the social norm 
pertaining to it. In contrast to existing studies, which either examine the effect of law on behavior 
(e.g., Funk, 2007) or on personal opinions (e.g., Chen and Yeh, 2014), we directly measure the 
influence of action’s legality on social norms. To do so, we use the norm-elicitation procedure 
introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We presented subjects with a series of vignettes 
describing a person behaving in a certain way. In each vignette, subjects were told to evaluate the 
social appropriateness of the person’s behavior. They were required to indicate how socially 
appropriate they thought this behavior was by selecting one option on a four-point ordered scale: 
“Very socially appropriate”, “Somewhat socially appropriate”, “Somewhat socially 
inappropriate”, or “Very socially inappropriate”.  
The task was incentivized: if a subject’s evaluation of the behavior in a vignette was the 
same as that chosen by most other subjects, the subject could be paid a cash bonus in addition to 
their participation fee; otherwise, they were only paid the participation fee. The incentives 
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transform the task into a coordination game in which subjects are incentivized to match the 
appropriateness evaluations of other participants in the experiment. The rationale for this 
incentive scheme is that, as argued by Krupka and Weber (2013), if a norm exists regarding the 
behavior being evaluated, then this constitutes a particularly salient focal point in the task that 
subjects can use to successfully coordinate. This being the case, subjects’ evaluations of the 
behavior in the vignette indirectly reveal the underlying social norm pertaining to that behavior. 
Moreover, the task incentivizes subjects to reveal how appropriate they believe particular 
behavior is commonly regarded, rather than their own personal evaluation of the behavior. As 
social norms are collectively recognized rules of behavior, rather than personal opinions about 
appropriate behaviors, this is a key element of the design (see Bicchieri, 2006 and Krupka and 
Weber, 2013 for a discussion of the difference between personal opinions and social norms). 
Five of the vignettes used in the study were designed to measure the effect of law on 
norms. As explained in the previous section, this was done by focusing on situations where the 
legality of a particular behavior is determined by which side of a legal threshold the behavior 
falls on. In particular, we considered five different types of legal thresholds, concerning: (i) the 
age of consent; (ii) the legal drinking age; (iii) the maximum amount of cash which is legal to 
import in one’s country without declaring to customs; (iv) the blood-alcohol content drink 
driving limit; and (v) the legal speed limit for driving on a motorway.7  
Each of our five vignettes described the behavior of a person engaged in a situation that 
involved one of these legal thresholds. The age of consent vignette described the situation of an 
adult engaging in sexual activity with a younger person that he had met at a party. The drinking 
age vignette described a shopkeeper selling alcohol to a youth who is known to be a local vandal. 
In the cash at customs vignette, a person was returning from abroad with a cash amount that he 
did not declare at customs. In the drink driving vignette, a woman was driving home after 
drinking on a night out. Finally, the speeding vignette described a woman driving on a 
                                           
7 We chose these five thresholds because they offer interesting variation in the severity of the illegal behavior, but 
also in relevant features of law enforcement, for instance the ability to monitor or accurately detect whether a 
behavior exceeds the legal threshold or not. Moreover, at least in one case (the cash at customs situation), we have 
an example of illegal behavior that is typically considered malum in prohibitum, i.e. wrong just because it has been 
deemed illegal (see, e.g., McAdams and Rasmusen, 2007). As discussed below, we will exploit this variation to shed 
light on the possible mechanisms that underlie the effects we observe in our experiment. 
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motorway. The vignettes, together with the experimental instructions, are reproduced in the 
Online Supplementary Materials (OSM) A and B.  
In all cases, we made it clear that the person in the vignette knew what the legal threshold 
was and could verify which side of the threshold their own behavior would fall on. For example, 
in the age of consent vignette, the adult checks the younger person’s ID card in order to verify 
whether she is above the age of consent. We deemed this important for two reasons. First, we 
wanted to subtly remind (or inform) our subjects about the existing legal rules that were relevant 
for each situation. Second, we wanted our subjects to evaluate the behavior of a person who was 
knowingly following or breaking the law, so as to remove any ambiguity about a potential 
“ignorance of the law”, which may have affected judgments of appropriateness.  
For each situation, we designed 4 (or 8, depending on the sample – see below) different 
versions of the vignette, which differed only in that they described behaviors falling on either 
side of the legal threshold and at different distances from it. This included behaviors that were 
only just legal or only just illegal, so as to measure the appropriateness of actions that were 
virtually identical in all respects other than their legal status. For instance, for the age of consent 
situation, we designed versions of the vignette where the younger person was 1, 2, 3, or 4 months 
above the age of consent, and versions where she was 1, 2, 3, or 4 months below the age of 
consent.  
The different versions of the vignettes were administered according to a between-subject 
design, so that each subject evaluated the appropriateness of only one behavior per situation. For 
example, some subjects were (only) described the vignette where the younger person was 1 
month above the age of consent, others were (only) described the vignette where she was 2 
months above; etc. These between-subject measurements of appropriateness allow us to obtain, 
for each situation, an estimate of the norm function 𝑁(. ) that regulates behavior in a 
neighborhood around the relevant legal threshold. Our identification strategy consists of testing, 
for each of the five vignettes, whether there is a discontinuity in the norm function 𝑁(. ) at the 
corresponding legal threshold. 8 
                                           
8 As discussed earlier, this strategy relies on the assumption that any factor other than legality that may affect the 
norm function 𝑁(. ), does not vary sharply in proximity of the threshold. A potential concern is that the norm 
function 𝑁(. ) may be “jumpy” in the proximity of “round numbers” such as those that are typically used in legal 
thresholds (e.g., in the case of age, the function may be discontinuous every time a person’s age changes by 1 year). 
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This identification strategy, and more generally the Krupka-Weber procedure to elicit 
social norms, relies on the crucial assumption that subjects use the norm as a focal point to 
coordinate their evaluations with those of others. However, in principle, subjects may use other 
salient coordination points as a mean to coordinate, in which case subjects’ responses would not 
be revealing the underlying social norm as intended. While the Krupka-Weber procedure has 
been carefully designed to avoid the presence of “nuisance” coordination principles (e.g., by 
avoiding the inclusion of a mid-point in the set of evaluation options; see Krupka and Weber, 
2013 for discussion), in our design this concern may be particularly relevant because legality in 
itself could be used as a focal principle for coordination. That is, subjects may use the following 
strategy to coordinate with others: rate actions that are legal as “appropriate” and actions that are 
illegal as “inappropriate”, regardless of whether this is what the underlying social norm truly 
prescribes. Note that this alternate coordination strategy would also give us a discontinuity at the 
threshold – albeit for the wrong reason. 
Our experiment contains two features that were designed to minimize this concern. First, 
when we gave subjects instructions about how to complete the evaluation task, we explicitly 
drew a distinction between the concept of social appropriateness and that of legality. We told 
subjects that by “socially appropriate” we meant “behavior that you think most people would 
agree is the ‘right’ thing to do”, and added: “Note that the ‘right’ thing to do may not necessarily 
be made explicit or supported by laws, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions. So an action 
may be ‘appropriate’ even if it is not legal; or ‘inappropriate’ even if it is not illegal. Rather, an 
appropriate action is an action that most people believe ought to be taken (regardless of whether 
it is legal or not), and they may be prepared to express their disapproval if it is not taken.”9. The 
inclusion of this passage in the instructions aims to reduce the incentive for subjects to use 
legality as a coordination device, since it breaks the cycle of beliefs that may support it as a 
                                           
We think that this is an unlikely explanation of our results. As we show below, the discontinuities we observe in our 
experiments are so large that there is simply no room on our appropriateness scale for similar-sized discontinuities to 
occur at other round numbers in the function. Moreover, we find that the discontinuities are moderated in their 
magnitudes by different aspects of the legal environment (see Section 4.2), which would be difficult to explain if 
they were the simple result of a “round number” effect. 
9 This language may, if anything, nudge subjects towards mentally separating the concepts of social appropriateness 
and legality further away than they are in reality. The consequence of this would be to make it less likely to observe 
an effect of laws on norms. As our null hypothesis is that laws do not affect norms, we considered this preferable to 
the alternative risk of subjects misinterpreting the term “social appropriateness” as being synonymous with or too 
close to “legal”. 
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successful coordination strategy (subjects should now be doubtful that others may use legality to 
coordinate given that they are explicitly told not to do so). 
Moreover, we included in the study three filler vignettes that were designed to train 
subjects to think of social appropriateness as a concept that is distinct from legality. In these 
vignettes, which were presented at the beginning of the experiment and thus before the five 
vignettes that are the focus of the study, subjects were described behavior which was unlikely to 
be considered very inappropriate, but that in one case was regulated by law and legal (a person 
deciding not to illegally download a movie), in another it was regulated by law and illegal (a 
person driving very slowly and safely without wearing a seatbelt), and in the third case it was not 
regulated by law (a person choosing between booking a holiday and giving money to charity).  
Overall, as we will discuss in more detail in the next section, our results suggest that we 
have been successful in minimizing the use of legality as coordination principle. In particular, 
there are multiple occurrences where our subjects did rate legal actions as inappropriate and 
illegal actions as appropriate, which runs counter the coordination strategy described above. 
Moreover, we do not observe a discontinuity in all vignettes – an outcome which we would have 
instead expected, had our subjects completed the task using legality as a coordination device.  
Finally, our experiment also included seven additional filler vignettes, which, along with 
the five legal threshold vignettes that are the focus of the study, were presented in random 
order.10 These vignettes were included in order to avoid it becoming salient to subjects that we 
were interested in the evaluation of behaviors regulated by a legal threshold – which might have 
triggered an experimenter demand effect. Moreover, this could have increased the saliency of 
legality as a potential coordination strategy. Thus, the seven filler vignettes featured a variety of 
types of behaviors that were either unregulated by law (e.g., a person refusing to give money to a 
beggar) or that were regulated by law but not by means of legal thresholds (e.g., a person leaving 
a restaurant without paying the bill). The filler vignettes were not subject to manipulation (i.e. we 
did not prepare different versions of them), so each one was identical for every subject. If such an 
experimenter demand had emerged, we would expect systematic differences in subjects’ 
responses to the first vignette they faced in which a legal threshold was relevant compared to 
                                           
10 Thus, each subject evaluated behavior in 15 vignettes in total: the 3 training vignettes used at the beginning of the 
study, the 7 filler vignettes, and one version of each of the 5 legal threshold vignettes. 
15 
 
their responses to later such vignettes. Our results show this was not present: the size of the 
estimated discontinuities do not tend to be larger or smaller for vignettes answered earlier or 
later.11 
3.2 Samples and Experimental Procedures 
Our experiment was run between September 2017 and March 2019 with a total of 820 
participants separately recruited in three different samples across two countries. We used two 
student samples (one from the UK and one from China), and one sample of the UK general 
population. In each case, subjects were told that, in order to receive the bonus payment from the 
Krupka-Weber task, they had to coordinate with other participants of their own sample. Thus, for 
instance, subjects in the UK student sample knew that they had to evaluate actions in the same 
way as other participants drawn from the same population as themselves. 
The UK student sample consisted of 197 British students at University of Nottingham. For 
each vignette with a legal threshold, subjects were randomly assigned to one of 4 possible 
versions of the vignette. Thus, our estimates of the norm function 𝑁(. ) relies on 4 distinct 
measurements (2 legal and 2 illegal) per vignette, from approximately 50 subjects each. Students 
completed the experiment online in around 10 minutes, and one-fifth of participants were 
selected for payment. The selected subjects were paid a £10 participation fee, plus a bonus 
payment of £30 if they had successfully coordinated in one of the 15 vignettes they had 
evaluated, randomly selected at the end of the study.  
To probe the generalizability of our findings, we repeated the experiment using a sample of 
the UK general population. The sample consisted of 375 British participants recruited by an 
online panel survey company.12 We set recruitment quotas so as to obtain a sample that was 
representative of the UK general population along three dimensions: gender (51% female), age 
(11% aged 18-24; 21% aged 25-34; 23% aged 35-44; 24% aged 45-54; 21% aged 55+), and 
                                           
11 This analysis of order effects is presented in more detail in OSM C. 
12 The company, Qualtrics, manages online panels of participants who have signed up to regularly take part in 
internet studies in exchange for compensation. The same company has been used, for instance, in the experiments of 
Hugh-Jones (2016) and Bursztyn et al. (2019). Hugh-Jones (2016) contains a discussion of how online experiments 
with Qualtrics samples compare with standard laboratory experiments with student samples. Boas et al. (2019) 
compares samples recruited online in the US and India via Qualtrics, Amazon Mechanical Turk and Facebook with 
nationally representative benchmarks in terms of demographics as well as several attitudinal and behavioral 
dimensions. They conclude that Qualtrics samples offer clear advantages over the other two online panels, being the 
“most demographically and politically representative”. 
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yearly income (23% less than £20,000; 42% £20,000-£40,000; 20% £40,000-£60,000; 15% more 
than £60,000).13 Again, subjects were randomly assigned to one version of each of the five 
vignettes with legal thresholds. This time, however, we designed 8 different versions of each 
vignette (4 legal and 4 illegal), so as to increase the precision of our estimate of the norm 
function 𝑁(. ). All subjects received a base incentive of approximately £0.40 for participating in 
the online study. In addition, we randomly selected one-fifth of participants and paid them 
(through Qualtrics) according to the same rules used for the UK student sample (£30 for 
successful coordination on one randomly selected vignette). 
This second experiment with the UK general population sample was also used to further 
probe one interesting result that had emerged from the experiment with the student samples. As 
we will show in the next section, we found that the law exerts a non-uniform influence on norms 
across the five situations we studied. We explored three mechanisms that could potentially 
explain why the law may be more effective in shaping some norms than others, related to the 
ability of law enforcement to monitor violations, the willingness to tolerate violations that are 
detected, and the ability of citizens to control which side of the legal threshold their behavior 
may fall on.  
To do so, after participants had completed the evaluations of the 15 vignettes, we asked 
them to consider, in random order, 5 additional scenarios which were similar to the 5 legal 
threshold situations they had already evaluated except that in all cases the scenarios now 
described an instance where the behavior was just on the illegal side of the threshold. For each 
scenario, participants were asked 4 (non-incentivized) questions, concerning whether they 
thought that: (i) the person in the vignette had in fact broken the law (and if they did not answer 
“Definitely”, they were asked to further explain their answer using an open-ended response); (ii) 
avoiding breaking the law was within a person’s control; (iii) the police, if they observed the 
behavior, could accurately detect whether the person had broken the law; and (iv) the police were 
likely to take action against the person in case of irrefutable evidence that they had broken the 
law. In all cases, responses were collected on a four-point ordered scale. 
                                           
13 According to 2017 census data, the UK population is divided in the following subgroups: 51% female; 15% of 
individuals aged 18-24, 21% aged 25-34, 21% aged 35-44, 23% aged 45-54, 20% aged 55+; and 21% with a yearly 
income less than £20,000, 41% with income £20,000-£40,000; 22% with income £40,000-£60,000; and 16% with 
income more than £60,000. 
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At the same time as the UK student experiment, we also collected data from a second 
student sample comprised of 248 Chinese students at the University of Nottingham Ningbo 
China. The main interest of this additional experiment was again to probe the generalizability of 
findings, this time by testing the effects of laws on norms in a very different legislative 
environment, one where the rule of law is relatively weak compared to the UK case (for instance, 
according to the 2016 Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project, the UK ranks 10th out of 
113 countries while China ranks 80th). Procedures used in the Chinese experiment were similar to 
those used in the UK student sample experiment. Instructions were first translated into Chinese 
and then back-translated in English, as usual practice. The Chinese vignettes were further slightly 
adjusted to reflect cross-country differences in the law (although laws regulating the five 
behavior under study exist in both countries, the cutoff values of the thresholds differ).14 
Incentives were converted using a PPP exchange rate of £1 = 6.2RMB, and the payment rules 
were the same as those in the UK students experiment.15  
4. RESULTS 
4.1 The Expressive Power of Law: UK Samples 
We start by presenting the results from our two UK samples. Figure 1 plots the norm functions 
elicited in the five legal threshold situations. These functions plot the average social 
appropriateness of the various behaviors that subjects evaluated in the experiment. Following the 
approach of Krupka and Weber (2013), we assign evenly-spaced values of +1 to the rating “Very 
socially appropriate”, +0.33 to the rating “Somewhat socially appropriate”, -0.33 to the rating 
“Somewhat socially inappropriate”, and -1 to the rating “Very socially inappropriate”. Thus, the 
norm functions 𝑁(. ) assume positive values for actions that, on average, are evaluated as socially 
appropriate and negative values for inappropriate actions. The blue circles show the function 
                                           
14 Other aspects of the real-world legal frameworks, regulating the actions featuring in the vignettes, may of course 
also have differed between the two countries. For instance, some laws may carry heavier punishments or be more 
strongly enforced in one country or the other. Therefore, while we kept all procedural features of the UK and China 
experiments as close as possible, our aim is not to conduct a fully controlled cross-cultural comparison of the effect 
of law on norms. Rather, we consider identifying the expressive power of laws in each country to be of independent 
interest. We can also comment on whether the results are qualitatively similar between the two countries.  
15 Monetary amounts in the vignettes were also adjusted according to PPP exchange rate (with rounding), except in 
the cash at customs vignette where the amounts were dictated by different legal thresholds between the UK and 
China. Conversions, subject to rounding, were also made between imperial and metric units, where relevant. 
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values for the student sample, while the red squares show the function values for the general 
population sample. Recall that for the latter sample we estimated 8 points on the function, as 
opposed to 4 points for the student sample.  
In each panel, the black dotted line indicates the position of the legal threshold. Actions to 
the left of the threshold are legal, while those to the right are illegal. The first three panels of the 
figure reveal that, in both samples, the legal threshold exerts a very strong influence on the norm 
function: there is a sharp drop in appropriateness values as we move from the legal to the illegal 
side of the thresholds. For the age of consent vignette, the appropriateness values drop from 
+0.23 to -0.74 (general population; students: -0.04 to -0.78) as the age of the young person in the 
vignette changes from 16 years and 1 month (1 month above the age of consent) to 15 years and 
11 months (1 month below the age of consent). For the vignette where a shopkeeper sells alcohol 
to a youth, the appropriateness values drop from +0.02 to -0.85 (general population; students: 
+0.26 to -0.81) as the age of the youth changes 1 month above the threshold to 1 month below 
the threshold. Finally, in the cash at customs vignette, the appropriateness values drop from 
+0.75 to -0.16 (general population; students: +0.86 to -0.07) as the person in the vignette imports 
undeclared cash that is either below or in excess of 100 Euros relative to the legal maximum. In 
all cases, it is also apparent that the small increments in the running variables (age and cash 
amount imported) are instead inconsequential for behaviors that are both on the legal side of the 
threshold, or both on the illegal side of the threshold.16  
The drop in appropriateness values at the legal threshold is instead much smaller in the 
drink driving and speeding vignettes, for both the student and general population samples. Here, 
the functions tend to decrease in the range of behavior measured in the experiment, but there are 
not such sharp discontinuities at the threshold. For the drink driving vignettes, the 
appropriateness values drop from +0.13 to -0.44 (general population; students: +0.08 to -0.29) as 
the blood alcohol concentration changes from 0.079g/100ml (legal) to 0.081g/100ml (illegal). 
For the speeding vignette, the appropriateness drops from +0.75 to +0.21 (general population;   
                                           
16 In OSM D we present in full the distributions of appropriateness ratings selected by subjects for each vignette. 
These bear out that, in the three vignettes discussed above, there are big changes in the evaluations when the 
threshold is crossed. For instance, in the Age of consent vignette, as evaluated by the general population, the older 
male having sex with the girl aged 16 years and 1 was rated “very socially inappropriate” by only 6.4% of subjects, 
which increased to 73.8% when the girl was aged 15 years and 11 months. 
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FIGURE 1 
Norms in the five legal threshold situations, UK samples 
  
  
 
Note: Each panel plots the average social appropriateness of actions at various distance from a legal threshold (1 = 
very socially appropriate; -1 = very socially inappropriate). The dashed black line indicates the position of the legal 
threshold in each situation (values of the legal thresholds reported in the bottom-right box). Actions to the left of the 
threshold are legal, actions to the right are illegal. Bars are 95% confidence intervals computed as 𝜇 ± 1.96 ∗ 𝑠𝑒(𝜇) 
where 𝜇 is the average appropriateness of an action and 𝑠𝑒(𝜇) the standard error of the mean. 
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Legal thresholds in the UK: 
- Age of Consent: 16 years 
- Legal Drinking Age: 18 years 
- Max. Undeclared Cash Amount: 10,000 Euros 
- Blood Alcohol Content: 0.08% (80 mg/100 ml) 
- Speed Limit on Motorway: 70 miles per hour 
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students: +0.93 to +0.66) as the speed changes from 69mph (legal) to 71mph (illegal). 
We formally examine these patterns using regression analysis. Based on the identification 
strategy sketched in equation (2), we estimate the following regression model for each vignette: 
𝑛(𝑎𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) + 𝛽2𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (3) 
where 𝑛(𝑎𝑖) is subject 𝑖’s evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior 𝑎𝑖 described in the 
vignette, (𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) measures the distance between the legal threshold and the behavior 𝑎𝑖 
evaluated by the subject, 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖 is a dummy that takes value 1 if subject 𝑖 evaluated a version 
of the vignette that contained illegal behavior and 0 otherwise, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. Note that 
this model allows the slope of the relationship between appropriateness and distance from the 
threshold to differ between legal and illegal actions. The coefficient 𝛽1 measures the relationship 
for legal actions, i.e., the slope of the function that we called 𝑁𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙() in Section 2.
17 The 
coefficient 𝛽3 measures how this slope changes for illegal, rather than legal, actions, i.e. it allows 
us to derive the slope of 𝑁𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙(). The coefficient of most interest is 𝛽2, which measures the 
difference between the estimates of the norm functions 𝑁𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙() and 𝑁𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙() at the legal 
threshold 𝑇, and thus captures the discontinuity of the norm at the legal threshold, i.e. the causal 
effect of law on normative considerations. 
We estimated the regression equation (3) separately for each sample and each vignette, 
using OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.18 Table 1 shows the results, 
in Panel A for the students sample and in Panel B for the general population sample.  
Starting with Panel A, the estimate of the coefficient 𝛽2 is negative and highly significant 
in models A1, A2 and A3 (the age of consent, alcohol to youth, and cash at customs vignettes), 
indicating the existence of strong discontinuities at the legal thresholds for these situations (the 
magnitude of 𝛽2 ranges from -0.778 to -1.035 across the three vignettes). In contrast, the 
estimates of 𝛽2 are much smaller in models A4 and A5 (the drink driving and speeding 
                                           
17 In two of our five vignettes (age of consent and alcohol to youth) actions below the threshold are illegal, while in 
the other three actions in excess of the threshold are illegal. To ease interpretation, we code our variable (𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) so 
that positive values are always assigned to legal actions and negative values to illegal actions. In other words, the 
variable is actually defined as (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑇) for the age of consent and alcohol to youth vignettes, while it is defined as 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) for the other three vignettes. 
18 For the general population sample we also have data on participants’ age, gender and income, which we use as 
controls in the regressions (not shown in Table 1). We did not collect any socio-demographic data from the students.  
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vignettes). The coefficient is in fact not significantly different from zero for the speeding 
vignette, and only significant at the 10% level for the drink driving vignette (p = 0.068). 
TABLE 1 
OLS regressions, UK samples 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) 
Panel A: 
Students 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.019 
(0.071) 
0.019 
(0.054) 
-0.007 
(0.039) 
0.016 
(0.061) 
-0.044 
(0.027) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.778*** 
(0.184) 
-1.035*** 
(0.138) 
-0.866*** 
(0.132) 
-0.326* 
(0.178) 
-0.103 
(0.107) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.078 
(0.081) 
0.004 
(0.064) 
0.072 
(0.061) 
0.017 
(0.077) 
0.258*** 
(0.055) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
-0.058 
(0.167) 
0.246** 
(0.114) 
0.868*** 
(0.079) 
0.067 
(0.141) 
0.977*** 
(0.053) 
R2 0.293 0.613 0.567 0.139 0.319 
N.  197 197 197 197 197 
      
 (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) 
Panel B: 
General population 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol    
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.026 
(0.038) 
-0.029 
(0.039) 
-0.055 
(0.038) 
-0.014 
(0.043) 
-0.039 
(0.033) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.890*** 
(0.128) 
-0.920*** 
(0.118) 
-0.948*** 
(0.124) 
-0.522*** 
(0.143) 
-0.461*** 
(0.127) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.001 
(0.051) 
0.034 
(0.045) 
0.058 
(0.051) 
0.024 
(0.058) 
0.145*** 
(0.049) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.216 
(0.140) 
0.264** 
(0.119) 
0.596*** 
(0.145) 
-0.040 
(0.153) 
0.623*** 
(0.126) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.467 0.405 0.373 0.160 0.263 
N.  375 375 375 375 375 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a vignette. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Controls (age, gender, and income) included in the regressions of Panel B but are 
not reported in the Table. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
A similar pattern emerges in Panel B. We find strong discontinuities in the norm functions 
for the age of consent, alcohol to youth, and cash at customs vignettes (coefficients ranging from 
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-0.890 to -0.948), but much weaker effects in the drink driving and speeding vignettes, where the 
coefficient estimates are roughly half the magnitude of the estimates of the other three vignettes.  
In both samples, a series of Chow tests confirm that, while there are no significant 
differences between the Illegal coefficients of first three vignettes, 𝛽2
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝛽2
𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙, and 𝛽2
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 
(all p > 0.346 for students; all p > 0.867 for the general population), or between the estimates of 
𝛽2
𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘−𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝛽2
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 (p = 0.347 for students; p = 0.932 for the general population), there 
are significant differences between the estimates of the first and second group of coefficients.19 
Specifically, among students, we find differences that are significant in all such comparisons (all 
p < 0.028) except between 𝛽2
𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘−𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝛽2
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 (p = 0.124); among the general population 
sample, we find significant differences in all such comparisons (all p < 0.089). 
Overall, our results show that the law can have a strong influence in shaping the norms that 
govern the behaviors that are targeted by the law. However, the results also show that the 
expressive power of law does not hold uniformly across all situations. In particular, our data 
show that, in the UK, laws related to driving behaviors seem to hold a weak power on the 
underlying social norms. We will return on this result in the next subsection, where we explore 
potential explanations for this variability in the expressive power of law. 
To conclude this sub-section, we briefly discuss two additional interesting results that 
emerge from our data. First, from a methodological point of view, it is remarkable that the 
comparative static results obtained with the student sample are successfully replicated using a 
representative sample of the broader population. In several cases, the point estimates of the 
appropriateness of various behaviors are virtually identical between the two samples. This result 
contributes to the ongoing debate about the generalizability of results of standard economic 
experiments (see, e.g., Levitt and List, 2007; Camerer, 2015).20 
                                           
19 We report p-values that are corrected, using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method (Benjamini 
and Hochberg, 1995), for the fact that we are performing multiple tests of the same hypothesis. 
20 Figure 1 shows that the responses of the general population sample are noisier than the student sample’s responses 
(see, e.g., the wider confidence interval bars). This is not entirely surprising, given that the reference group that 
subjects were told they had to coordinate with in the Krupka-Weber task, is broader and less well-defined than in the 
case of students (students knew they had to coordinate with other University of Nottingham students, while the 
general population subjects were simply told that they had to coordinate with another British participant). This 
makes the overall replicability of findings even more remarkable. 
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Another interesting result is that our data suggest that the Krupka-Weber task may be 
robust to the presence of “nuisance” coordination points – in particular, we see patterns in our 
data that are inconsistent with the notion that subjects used legality as an alternative coordination 
strategy. First, Figure 1 shows that, in both samples, there are several instances of legal behaviors 
being evaluated as inappropriate and illegal behaviors being evaluated as appropriate. This is not 
just true in terms of the averages reported in Figure 1, but also in terms of modal responses, as 
shown in OSM D. Second, we do not see uniform effects of the law on norms. Third, if subjects 
use legality to coordinate with other participants, one would expect this strategy to be likely to 
emerge and get stronger over time as they notice that many of the vignettes are related to legal 
thresholds. However, as reported in OSM C, the effect of law on norms does not increase or 
decrease as subjects progress through the vignettes. 
4.2 Variability in the Expressive Power of Law: Possible Mechanisms 
The previous subsection has shown that the expressive power of law varies across the five legal 
threshold situations. This is true for both the student and general population samples, suggesting 
the existence of a systematic separation between the age of consent, alcohol to youth, and cash at 
customs situations on the one hand, and the drink driving and speeding situations on the other. 
This separation does not seem related to the legal nature of the offence described in the vignette 
(the UK legal system differentiates between “summary” and “indictable” offences, but this does 
not organize the data; for instance, both selling alcohol to minors and speeding are summary 
offences), nor does it appear to be positively correlated with the severity of the legal penalties 
(for instance, importing undeclared cash at customs is subject to a fine of up to £5,000, while a 
drink-driving offence is subject to up to 6 months’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, and a driving 
ban for at least 1 year).21  
This variability in the effect of law on norms is interesting because it speaks against the 
notion that the expressive function of law can be fully explained by a meta-norm of legal 
obedience, in which case one would expect a uniform effect across the five legal situations. The 
variability is, however, in principle consistent with the mechanism proposed by Eric Posner, 
                                           
21 Information retrieved at https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/. 
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whereby the extent to which laws influence norms depends on the strength of the signal that 
illegal behavior sends about the “type” of person who violates the law.  
To probe whether this could indeed be a plausible explanation for what we observe in the 
data, in the experiment with the UK general population we included a series of follow-up 
questions designed to capture three aspects of the situations described in the vignettes that we 
thought may i) vary across the five legal scenarios and ii) influence the informativeness of the 
signal sent by law violations about the transgressor. These aspects are: 1) whether illegal 
behavior can be measured accurately or with a margin of error (which we refer to as 
“measurability” below); 2) the level of tolerance adopted by law enforcement towards law 
violations (“tolerance”); and 3) the extent to which law violations may be accidental rather than 
intentional (“intentionality”). For instance, we hypothesized that (small) violations of the speed 
law may be perceived as subject to possible measurement error and potentially accidental and 
tolerated by the police, compared to transgressions of, e.g., the age of consent law. If this is the 
case, we would expect that speed law violations may provide a noisier signal about a person’s 
type relative to violations of the age of consent law, and, according to Posner, this could explain 
why speeding laws have a weaker effect on norms compared to age of consent laws. 
To examine this conjecture, for each vignette we asked subjects to report, for a person 
whose behavior fell just on the illegal side of the threshold, the extent to which they agreed that: 
1) the police could accurately measure the legality of the behavior; 2) if the police were sure the 
person had broken the law, they would be likely to take action against them; 3) avoiding breaking 
the law would have been within the person’s control.22 As these beliefs were all recorded on a 
four-point ordered scale, we transform the answers onto an evenly spaced numerical scale, with 1 
indicating the highest level of agreement and -1 the lowest.  
We use the responses to these questions in two ways. First, we check whether there is 
indeed variability in the perceptions of measurability, tolerance and intentionality across the five 
                                           
22 Minor presentational changes were made to the follow-up questions after the first 35 observations were collected. 
See OSM C and OSM F for details and discussion of the negligible impact these changes make to our results. As 
mentioned in section 3.2 we also asked subjects whether they thought that the person in the vignette had broken the 
law, with those not responding “Definitely” asked to provide an open-ended explanation. This was included to check 
whether subjects would refer in their explanations to other potential moderators of the expressive power of law 
beyond those we specifically asked them about. Very few subjects did, while many referred to measurability, 
tolerance and, to a lesser extent, intentionality in their explanations.  
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situations – a necessary conditions for these factors to be candidate sources of between-vignette 
variability in the expressive power of law. Second, having established this, we check whether the 
effect of law on norms differs across subjects who hold different perceptions about each of these 
factors – indicating that they are indeed mediators of the expressive power of law. 
The right panel in Figure 2 shows, for each vignette, the mean perceptions of measurability 
of behavior, tolerance and intentionality. We observe clear differences across vignettes in each of 
the three factors. Of particular interest are the differences between the two groups of situations 
between which we observed differences in the expressive power of law (speeding and drink-drive 
on one hand; age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs on the other). 
Regarding speeding, as expected, we find that subjects perceive lower accuracy in 
measuring behavior, lower likelihood of police intervention, and lower intentionality in breaking 
the law in the speeding vignette compared to the three vignettes with stronger expressive power 
of law (the differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level, except in the comparison of 
intentionality with cash at customs).23 Regarding drink-driving, the evidence is more mixed. We 
do find that, compared to violations of the age of consent and sale of alcohol to minors laws, 
drink-driving offences are perceived to be less accurately measurable (both p < 0.001) and less 
likely to be prosecuted (both p < 0.099). However, intentionality is only significantly lower in the 
drink-driving vignette than in the alcohol to youth vignette (p = 0.024). Moreover, the differences 
between the drink-driving and cash at customs vignettes are either insignificant (measurability 
and intentionality) or significant in the opposite direction relative to the conjecture (tolerance).  
In spite of this mixed evidence, this first analysis suggests that any of these three factors 
can potentially explain some of the between-vignette variability in the expressive power of law. 
To investigate whether they systematically moderate the influence that the law exerts on social 
norms in the five situations, we conduct an effect heterogeneity analysis – that is, we examine 
whether the magnitude of the discontinuity of the norm functions at the legal threshold varies 
across subjects who hold different perceptions of measurability, tolerance and intentionality. 
                                           
23 The significance of cross-vignette differences is tested by OLS regressions containing the numerically-
transformed response as the dependent variable, with vignette dummies along with demographic control variables 
(the full output of these are reported in OSM E). The p-values reported in the text have been corrected, using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method. 
26 
 
FIGURE 2 
Measurability of behavior, police tolerance and intentionality as mediators of the effect of legal thresholds on norms 
 
Note: The right panel plots the perceived measurability of behavior, police tolerance and intentionality in each vignette. Bars are 95% confidence intervals 
computed as 𝜇 ± 1.96 ∗ 𝑠𝑒(𝜇) where 𝜇 is the average perception of measurability/tolerance/intentionality and 𝑠𝑒(𝜇) its standard error. The left panel plots the 
estimated magnitude of the discontinuity in the norm function at the threshold for each vignette, disaggregated between subjects who think that: 1) behavior can 
or cannot be measured very accurately (full or hollow square), 2) police is or is not very likely to take action upon detection of a crime (full or hollow circle), 3) 
the individual has or has not complete control of their behavior in the situation (full or hollow triangle). The black connectors between markers indicate whether 
the corresponding difference is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% in the OLS regressions reported in OSM E. 
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To do so, for each follow-up question we divide subjects into two types, depending on 
whether or not they expressed the highest possible level of agreement(that is, they said that in a 
given vignette behavior was very accurately measurable, police were very likely to take action  
against violators, and behavior was completely within the control of the individual). We then 
repeat the regression analysis of Panel B of Table 1, separately for each factor, including 
dummies capturing a subject’s type and interacting these with the Illegal dummy. We use these 
regressions (reported in OSM E) to test whether the magnitude of the discontinuities of the norm 
functions differ between subjects who express the highest possible level of agreement to the 
given question and those who do not. 
The left panel in Figure 2 presents the estimates of the magnitude of these discontinuities in 
each vignette for subjects belonging to either group. A number of interesting results emerge from 
this analysis. First, in virtually all cases, the effect of the law on norms is larger among subjects 
who rate the illegal behavior described in the vignette as highly measurable, very likely to be 
prosecuted, and completely within the control of the person.  
Second, the significance of these differences varies across the three factors. For police 
tolerance, the differences are never significant except in the case of the cash at custom vignette, 
where it is significant at the 5% level. Thus, although perceptions of police tolerance differ 
widely across vignettes (see right panel of Figure 2), this factor alone cannot explain the 
observed differences in expressive power of the law across situations since it does not moderate 
the effect of law on norms. 
In contrast, both measurability and intentionality of behavior are moderators of the effect of 
the law on norms for the speeding, age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs 
behavior. Since we also observe differences in perceptions of measurability and intentionality of 
behavior between the speeding vignette and the other three vignettes (right panel of Figure 2), 
these two factors can partly explain the differences in expressive power of law between these 
situations. In the speeding vignette, subjects think that small violations of the law are measured 
more inaccurately and are poorer reflections of a person’s intentions than in the other three cases, 
and this reduces the influence that the law has on shaping the underlying norm of conduct. 
However, there is not much evidence that these factors can explain the differences between 
the drink-driving vignette and the three vignettes with strong expressive power of law. Neither 
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measurability nor intentionality of behavior are in fact moderators of the effect of law on norms 
in the drink-driving vignette. 
Overall, this analysis shows that contextual differences in the measurability and 
intentionality of behavior can partially explain the differences in the expressive power of laws 
observed in the main experiment. These results provide suggestive support for Posner’s signaling 
mechanism. In situations where the illegality of behavior is difficult to observe, or may be 
accidental, it conveys a weaker signal about the type of person who engages in such behavior, 
and should therefore not be expected to impact strongly on the norms regulating that behavior.   
4.3 The Expressive Power of Law: China Sample  
In this final section, we report the results of the experiment conducted with a sample of 248 
students at a Chinese university. Figure 3 shows the norm functions estimated from the responses 
of the Chinese students. The figure has the same structure of Figure 1 above. Table 2 contains the 
regression estimates of this data, using the same models shown in equation (3). 
In the Chinese sample, we observe that the law also exerts expressive power on norms, 
albeit again the effect is not uniform across the five situations. In contrast to the UK case, in 
China the law seems to have its strongest effects on norms in the case of the cash at customs and 
speeding vignettes. The effect is weaker for the age of consent and alcohol to youth vignettes, 
and statistically insignificant for the drink driving vignette. A series of Chow tests confirm that 
the law tends to carry different expressive power in the cash at customs and speeding situations 
compared to the other three situations.25 
Thus, although there are some differences between the UK and Chinese samples, 
particularly in the type of situations characterized by strong effects of the law, which probably 
reflect inherent differences in culture as well as in the specifics of the law (e.g., different 
threshold values) and law enforcement between the two countries, the main result that the law 
can have expressive power, but that this varies across situations, carries over to the Chinese 
sample. It is interesting to note that this data were collected in a very different legislative 
                                           
25 Specifically, we find that 𝛽2
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ and 𝛽2
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 are not significantly different from each other (p = 0.233), 𝛽2
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ is 
significantly different from the other three coefficients (all p < 0.027), and 𝛽2
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 is significantly different from 
𝛽2
𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘−𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒 (p = 0.034). All other comparisons are statistically insignificant. (All p-values are corrected using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method). 
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environment, characterized by markedly weaker rule of law compared to the UK. This shows that 
the expressive power of law does not require a strong rule of law to take hold. 
FIGURE 3 
Norms in the five legal threshold situations, China sample 
 
 
Note: Each panel plots the average social appropriateness of actions at various distance from a legal threshold (1 = 
very socially appropriate; -1 = very socially inappropriate). The dashed black line indicates the position of the legal 
threshold in each situation (values of the legal thresholds reported in the bottom-right box). Actions to the left of the 
threshold are legal, actions to the right are illegal. Bars are 95% confidence intervals computed as 𝜇 ± 1.96 ∗ 𝑠𝑒(𝜇) 
where 𝜇 is the average appropriateness of an action and 𝑠𝑒(𝜇) the standard error of the mean. 
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Legal thresholds in China: 
- Age of Consent: 14 years 
- Legal Drinking Age: 18 years 
- Max. Undeclared Cash Amount: 5,000 USD 
- Blood Alcohol Content: 0.02% (20 mg/100 ml) 
- Speed Limit on Motorway: 120 km per hour 
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TABLE 2 
OLS regressions, China Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.050 
(0.061) 
0.046 
(0.049) 
-0.023 
(0.054) 
0.097* 
(0.053) 
0.028 
(0.050) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.495*** 
(0.061) 
-0.410** 
(0.160) 
-1.078*** 
(0.158) 
-0.215 
(0.151) 
-0.751*** 
(0.157) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.006 
(0.069) 
0.029 
(0.066) 
0.044 
(0.074) 
-0.019 
(0.069) 
-0.006 
(0.068) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
-0.243* 
(0.132) 
-0.068 
(0.117) 
0.690*** 
(0.105) 
-0.161 
(0.108) 
0.472*** 
(0.117) 
R2 0.301 0.285 0.468 0.213 0.396 
N.  248 248 248 248 248 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a vignette. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance 
level. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
For some years scholars from across the social sciences have asserted that laws carry expressive 
power, i.e. the ability to shape social norms. Although suggestive evidence in support of this 
proposition has previously been provided from studying behavior (e.g., Funk, 2007) or personal 
opinions (Chen and Yeh, 2014), this paper is the first to confirm it by directly measuring social 
norms. Our design – taking advantage both of recent advances in methods to estimate norms, and 
vignettes with laws characterized by thresholds – allows us to conclude that the legal status of an 
action does causally influence its normative appropriateness. 
This has important implications for the effectiveness of laws. It implies the impact of laws 
on behavior is likely to be greater than their mere deterrent effect alone. As we outline in Section 
2, one way a law can alter behavior is by changing the material incentives of the actions it 
prohibits – this is the mechanism through which economists have traditionally argued laws take 
effect (e.g., Becker, 1968). However, if we accept the argument that social norms also determine 
preferences over actions, then a strengthening of social disapproval towards an action resulting 
from it being illegal provides an additional mechanism through which laws can act in 
conjunction with deterrence. Moreover, the effects on behavior of this expressive power may be 
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substantial: in some of our vignettes we find the effect of law on norms to be not just statistically 
significant but of a quantitatively large magnitude. 
However, we also find that the expressive power of laws is not uniform. In some cases we 
find it to be weaker, or even not statistically significant. We have provided evidence that part of 
this variability may be driven by contextual differences over the intentionality and measurability 
of illegal behavior. This suggests laws will tend to have stronger expressive power if it is easy to 
accurately detect when they have been broken, and less likely that they will be broken by 
accident. 
As discussed above, different mechanisms have been proposed for why laws would 
influence norms. Theories that laws transmit information about what society approves of, though 
empirically possible, cannot be tested in our design. In light of our results, we can however 
comment on the meta-norm explanations of Cooter (1998; 2000) and McAdams and Rasmusen 
(2007) – that obeying the law is itself a norm. While our results do not rule out this possibility, 
they cannot be fully explained by a meta-norm alone. We would expect this meta-norm to 
produce an expressive power of laws which is constant across contexts – we therefore need a 
further explanation as to why it is not (i.e. why the strength of the meta-norm itself would be 
context-dependent).  
We argue that this can be provided, at least in part, by the signaling theory of Posner (1998; 
2000; 2002). This proposes that illegality can make behavior less appropriate because of the 
signal it sends about the person committing it. In scenarios where the illegality can be 
unintentional or difficult to observe, one would expect the signal conveyed to be weaker and 
therefore less impactful upon norms. This is consistent with what we find. 
Our results suggest the overall effectiveness of laws will – by virtue of their greater impact 
on norms – be stronger where it is difficult to break them by accident and easy to detect when 
they have been broken. It may be particularly unlikely, for instance, for these criteria to apply to 
motoring laws, not least because people cannot perfectly control their driving. Also on the matter 
of intentionality, a person might accidentally break a law which they are not aware of, or which 
is difficult to understand. Governments would therefore have more success passing laws which 
are not overly complex and are well communicated to the public.   
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Our study finds that the general tendency for norms to be affected by laws holds not just 
across a range of different decision-making contexts, but also within different subject pools. The 
patterns of data drawn from the UK general population are similar to those from the UK students. 
This provides a hopeful message to the academic community regarding the external validity of 
researching social norms on student subjects.  
The results of the experiment run on the Chinese sample differ somewhat from those in the 
UK. The scenarios in which the law has its strongest expressive power are not the same in the 
two countries. We are agnostic as to the reasons for these differences. They may be driven by 
cultural factors, as well as differences relating to the legal framework (e.g., different legal 
thresholds, different likely severity of punishment for lawbreakers in different cases). Instead, we 
emphasize the general point: just as in the UK, we find in China that laws generally affect norms, 
but the strength of the effect varies across contexts. This is good news for lawmakers in countries 
(such as China) where the rule of law is weaker. One might have expected that in jurisdictions 
where laws are more frequently ignored, it would be difficult to pass laws which carry expressive 
power. This could create a negative feedback problem, as influencing social norms is one way 
that a strong rule of law can help establish itself. Our results, however, do not suggest the 
existence of this problem for governments seeking to strengthen the rule of law.  
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 Supplementary Materials A contains details about and full wording of the vignettes. 
 Supplementary Materials B contains screenshots from the experiment. 
 Supplementary Materials C contains analysis of order effects. 
 Supplementary Materials D contains full distributions of social appropriateness ratings. 
 Supplementary Materials E contains regressions behind the analysis concerning the 
follow-up questions in Section 4.2. 
 Supplementary Materials F replicates the analysis of Supplementary Materials E with the 
exclusion of observations from our soft launch. 
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Supplementary Materials A: Vignettes 
The five vignettes we chose to investigate describe different types of behavior, all of which are 
illegal only if particular thresholds are crossed. The five behaviors to be evaluated were: 1) an 
older adult having sex with a person just below or above the legal age of consent; 2) selling 
alcohol to a youth who is known to be a vandal who is just below or above the age at which a 
person can legally be sold alcohol; 3) entering one’s country with an amount of cash just below 
or above the threshold at which it must legally be declared to customs, and not declaring it; 4) 
driving with a blood-alcohol level just below or above the legal limit; 5) driving at a speed just 
below or above the legal speed limit. 
These behaviors were chosen because each is subject to a legal threshold in both the UK and 
China (although for some of them the threshold is set at different levels in each country). 
Moreover, we wanted to select behaviors which, in their legal version, would cover a range of 
positions across the social appropriateness scale. For instance, while it may be viewed as morally 
dubious – even when such behavior is legal – for an older adult to have sex with a younger 
person, or for someone to sell alcohol to a youth, it is unlikely that anyone would consider it 
inappropriate to drive just below the legal speed limit, or carry a large but legal amount of cash 
undeclared through customs.  
All five of the vignettes are constructed such that subjects are made aware of the legal threshold, 
and in all cases the characters whose behavior they are evaluating also know whether their 
behavior is legal or illegal. The full wording of the vignettes follows below. Where two wordings 
appear in parentheses, the wording on the left applies to the UK experiments and the wording to 
the right to the China experiment. 
Age of consent Vignette: A (20/18) year old man meets a girl at a party. The man invites the girl 
to come to his home, and she agrees. At his home, the man tells the girl he wants to have sex 
with her, but that she looks young, and asks whether she is above the legal age of consent of 
(16/14) years. The girl tells the man that she is aged (Age)*, and shows him an ID card which 
confirms this. She tells the man that she wants to have sex with him. The man then has sex with 
the girl. 
How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to have sex with the girl? 
* The possible value of (Age) were: 16 years and 3 months, 16 years and 1 month, 15 years and 
11 months or 15 years and 9 months in the UK student experiment; 16 years and 4 months, 16 
years and 3 months, 16 years and 2 months, 16 years and 1 month, 15 years and 11 months, 15 
years and 10 months, 15 years and 9 months or 15 years and 8 months in the UK general 
population experiment; 14 years and 3 months, 14 years and 1 month, 13 years and 11 months or 
13 years and 9 months in the China student experiment.  
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Alcohol to youth Vignette: A youth enters a local shop with the intention of buying some beer. 
He sees a sign in the shop reminding customers that in (Britain/China) it is illegal for 
shopkeepers to sell alcohol to people younger than 18 years. The shopkeeper knows the youth 
personally, and knows that he is aged (Age)*. The shopkeeper knows that the youth often gets 
drunk and vandalises property in his neighbourhood. The youth, who appears sober, asks to buy a 
box containing 20 alcoholic beers, and the shopkeeper sells it to him. 
How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the 
youth?  
*The possible value of (Age) were: 18 years and 3 months, 18 years and 1 month, 17 years and 
11 months or 17 years and 9 months in the UK student and China student experiments; 18 years 
and 4 months, 18 years and 3 months, 18 years and 2 months, 18 years and 1 month, 17 years 
and 11 months, 17 years and 10 months, 17 years and 9 months or 17 years and 8 months in the 
UK general population experiment.  
Cash at customs Vignette: A man is returning to (Britain/China) from an overseas holiday. In 
his suitcase he is carrying cash worth (Amount)*. In the airport he notices a sign informing 
passengers that it is illegal to bring cash worth more than (€10,000 into Britain / 5,000 US dollars 
into China) from overseas without declaring it to customs. After reading the sign, the man enters 
the country without declaring the cash to customs. 
How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to enter the country without 
declaring the cash to customs? 
*The possible values of (Amount) were €9,700, €9,900, €10,100 or €10,300 in the UK student 
experiment; €9,600, €9,700, €9,800, €9,900, €10,100, €10,200, €10,300 or €10,400 in the UK 
general population experiment; $4,700, $4,900, $5,100 or $5,300 in the China student 
experiment.  
Drink driving Vignette: A woman works for a company which manufactures state-of-the-art 
breathalysers, machines which can measure a person’s blood alcohol content with extremely high 
accuracy. One day, after drinking in a bar in (City)*, the woman remembers she has one of the 
breathalysers in her bag, and wonders whether her blood alcohol content is below (0.08% / 
0.02%), the maximum level at which a person can legally drive in (England/China). 26 She tests 
herself and discovers that her blood alcohol content is (Percentage)**. The woman then drives 
home. 
How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive home?   
                                           
26 The UK version specifies ‘England’ rather than ‘Britain’ because, unlike the laws featured in the other scenarios, 
drink-driving laws differ across the constituent countries of the UK. 
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*(City) was ’Nottingham’ in the UK student experiment, ‘Ningbo’ in the China student 
experiment, and ‘a city in England’ in the UK general population experiment. 
**The possible values of (Percentage) were: 0.077%, 0.079%, 0.081% or 0.083% in the UK 
student experiment; 0.076%, 0.077%, 0.078%, 0.079%, 0.081%, 0.082%, 0.083% or 0.084% in 
the UK general population experiment; 0.017%, 0.019%, 0.021% or 0.023% in the China student 
experiment.  
Speeding Vignette: A woman is driving between two cities in order to attend a meeting. She 
turns onto a road and notices a sign informing motorists that the legal speed limit on the road is 
(70 miles per hour / 120 kilometres per hour). The woman drives for the next five minutes at 
(Speed)*, before turning onto a different road. 
How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive at (Speed)? 
*The possible values of (Speed) were: 67, 69, 71 or 73 miles per hour in the UK student 
experiment; 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73 or 74 miles per hour in the UK general population 
experiment; 117, 119, 121, 123 kilometers per hour in the China student experiment.  
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Supplementary Materials B: Screenshots of the experiments 
We first present screenshots from the UK experiments and then from the China experiment. The 
size has been adjusted so that each screen fits on one page – in the experiment itself subjects 
could scroll up and down. 
UK experiments 
Screenshots are taken from the general population experiment. Where the student experiment 
differed, this is explained below each screenshot.  
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
6 
 
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
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In student experiment, following Any information provided will be confidential, the additional 
sentences: Your student ID number will be taken so that we can contact participants who are 
selected to receive payment, but when stored the data will be anonymized as quickly as possible, 
and your identity will not be revealed to any third party. 
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Additional screen at this point in student experiment, reading: 
This survey should take around 45 minutes to complete. If you need to stop, you can save your 
responses and return to the survey later. 
First, please enter your student ID number. Make sure you enter this correctly, as we will use it 
to contact you regarding payment. (followed by box to enter ID number) 
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In student experiment, this screen read: 
 
Regarding payment: 
 
After all participants have completed the survey, we will randomly pick one out of every five to 
receive payment. We will email all participants by September 28 to notify them whether they 
have been selected for payment or not. Participants selected for payment will then be able to 
collect their money from the Clive Granger Building on University Park Campus. If you have any 
questions regarding payment for this survey, please email Tom.Lane@nottingham.edu.cn. 
 
If you are selected for payment, you will receive a participation fee of £10. Based on your 
response to the survey, you may also receive an additional £30. Further details will be provided 
at the relevant point in the survey. 
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In student experiment, the final two sentences read: To reward you, if your answer to this 
question is the same as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey, 
and if you are one of the participants selected for payment, we will give you £30 in addition to 
your participation fee. All participants in this survey are British and studying at the University of 
Nottingham. 
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In student experiment, selected as eligible for bonus payment replaced by selected for payment. 
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14 
 
(The following three vignettes were presented in random order) 
 
In student experiment, village in your region replaced by village near Nottingham. 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
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In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
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In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
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(The following 12 vignettes were presented in random order) 
 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
18 
 
 
 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
 
19 
 
 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
 
20 
 
 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
 
21 
 
 
In student experiment, your local city replaced by Nottingham. 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
 
22 
 
 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
 
23 
 
 
In student experiment, your local city replaced by Nottingham. 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
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In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
25 
 
 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
 
26 
 
 
In student experiment, a city in England replaced by Nottingham. 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
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In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
28 
 
 
In student experiment, last sentence read: Remember that all participants in this survey are 
British and studying at the University of Nottingham. 
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(Not included in student experiment) 
 
30 
 
(Following questions about the five scenarios presented in random order) 
 
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
(This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our 
soft launch data (N=35), which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up 
questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about 
the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning The girl tells the 
man…was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (which is below the minimum legal age of 16 
years) was absent.)  
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(Not included if subject answered Definitely to previous question) 
(Not included in student experiment) 
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(Not included in student experiment) 
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(Not included in student experiment) 
(This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our 
soft launch data (N=35), which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up 
questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about 
the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning The shopkeeper knows 
the youth…was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (which is below the minimum legal age 
of 18 years) was absent.)  
34 
 
 
 
(Not included if subject answered Definitely to previous question) 
(Not included in student experiment) 
 
35 
 
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
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(Not included in student experiment) 
(This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our 
soft launch data (N=35), which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up 
questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about 
the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning She tests herself…was 
not initially in bold, and the parentheses (which is above the maximum legal level of 0.08%) was 
absent.)  
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(Not included if subject answered Definitely to previous question) 
(Not included in student experiment) 
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(Not included in student experiment) 
39 
 
 
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
(This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our 
soft launch data (N=35), which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up 
questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about 
the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning In his suitcase…was 
not initially in bold, and the parentheses (which is above the maximum legal amount of €10,000) 
was absent.)  
40 
 
 
 
 
(Not included if subject answered Definitely to previous question) 
(Not included in student experiment) 
 
41 
 
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
42 
 
 
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
(This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our 
soft launch data (N=35), which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up 
questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about 
the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning The woman 
drives…was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (which is above the maximum legal speed 
of 70 miles per hour) was absent.)  
43 
 
 
 
 
(Not included if subject answered Definitely to previous question) 
(Not included in student experiment) 
 
44 
 
 
(Not included in student experiment) 
 
45 
 
China experiment 
 
46 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
49 
 
 
50 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
52 
 
(The following three vignettes were presented in random order) 
 
 
53 
 
 
54 
 
 
 
55 
 
(The following 12 vignettes were presented in random order) 
 
56 
 
 
57 
 
 
58 
 
 
59 
 
 
60 
 
 
61 
 
 
62 
 
 
63 
 
 
64 
 
 
65 
 
 
66 
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Supplementary Materials C: Analysis of order effects 
In this section we show that the strength of the estimated effect of law on norms for any vignette 
is not dependent on the order in which that vignette is presented to subjects. To do this, we re-run 
the regressions from Table 1 and Table 2 separately based on the position, out of the five 
vignettes featuring legal thresholds, in which each appears, i.e. we analyze each vignette 
separately for those subjects for whom this vignette is the first, second, third, fourth or fifth of 
these vignettes that the subject sees. We then compare the size of the coefficient on Illegal 
between these regressions. Casual inspection of this data shows that the coefficient is not 
systematically higher or lower for vignettes presented earlier or later. These coefficients are 
reported in Table C1 (for the UK experiments) and Table C2 (for the China experiment). We ran 
pairwise Chow Tests to determine which of the coefficients, for a given vignette amongst a given 
sample, significantly differ from one another. All significant results at the 10% level or lower are 
reported in the tables (note that we do not correct the p-values using the Benjamini-Hochberg 
False Discovery Rate method to avoid being conservative in favor of the null hypothesis). These 
are few in number, and split between those showing higher coefficients for earlier and later 
presentations of the vignettes.  
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TABLE C1: COEFFICIENTS ON ILLEGAL IN UK EXPERIMENTS 
Panel A: Students 
  Age of 
consent 
Alcohol to 
youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
Order of 
vignette 
1 -1.001** -1.347*** -1.046*** -0.231 -0.227 
2 -0.773* -0.991*** -0.820*** -0.528 0.054 
3 -0.944** -0.699*** -0.114 -0.206 -0.070 
4 -0.443 -1.130*** -0.885*** -0.518 -0.133 
5 -0.752* -1.093*** -1.214*** -0.369 -0.367 
Significant differences 
(Chow Tests – 
uncorrected p-values) 
- - 
3>1 
(p=0.027) 
3>4 
(p=0.049) 
3>5 
(p=0.010) 
- - 
Panel B: General population 
  Age of 
consent 
Alcohol to 
youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
Order of 
vignette 
1 -0.861*** -0.778** -0.591 -0.965*** -0.586** 
2 -0.465 -0.796*** -0.995*** -0.450 -0.615** 
3 -0.883*** -0.862*** -0.673** -0.152 0.076 
4 -1.024*** -1.341*** -0.923*** -0.745** -0.578* 
5 -1.125*** -0.974*** -1.371*** -0.695* -0.537** 
Significant differences 
(Chow Tests – 
uncorrected p-values) 
- - 
1>5 
(p=0.069) 
3>5 
(p=0.074) 
3>1 
(p=0.040) 
3>1 
(p=0.079) 
3>2 
(p=0.083) 
Note: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
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TABLE C2: COEFFICIENTS ON ILLEGAL IN CHINA EXPERIMENT 
  Age of 
consent 
Alcohol to 
youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
Order of 
vignette 
1 -0.617** -0.602 -0.984*** -0.426 -0.252 
2 -0.426 -0.422 -0.849*** -0.334 -1.302*** 
3 -0.423 -0.002 -0.989*** -0.045 -0.277 
4 -0.553* 0.338 -1.347*** -0.072 -1.108*** 
5 -0.555* -1.223*** -1.526*** -0.142 -1.110*** 
Significant differences 
(Chow Tests – 
uncorrected p-values) 
- 
4>1 
(p=0.064) 
4>5 
(p<0.001) 
2>5 
(p=0.059) 
3>5 
(p=0.011) 
- - 
1>2 
(p=0.017) 
1>4 
(p=0.049) 
1>5 
(p=0.031) 
3>2 
(p=0.058) 
Note: *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70 
 
Supplementary Materials D: Distributions of social appropriateness ratings 
TABLE D1: APPROPRIATENESS OF SEX IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE: 
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS 
 Very socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very socially 
appropriate 
Panel A: UK Students 
Age of 
girl 
(years, 
months) 
16, 3 16.7 35.4 29.2 18.8 
16, 1 23.3 27.9 30.2 18.6 
15, 11 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 
15, 9 59.0 31.2 9.8 0.0 
Panel B: UK General population 
Age of 
girl 
(years, 
months) 
16, 4 5.3 26.3 26.3 42.1 
16, 3 8.0 24.0 46.0 22.0 
16, 2 10.0 17.5 45.0 27.5 
16, 1 6.4 23.8 49.2 20.6 
15, 11 73.8 16.4 6.6 3.3 
15, 10 77.1 8.6 8.6 5.7 
15, 9 76.5 13.7 7.8 2.0 
15, 8 83.8 8.1 2.7 5.4 
Panel C: China Students 
Age of 
girl 
(years, 
months) 
14, 3 24.6 32.8 24.6 18.0 
14, 1 24.6 40.4 24.6 10.5 
13, 11 76.6 14.1 9.4 0.0 
13, 9 81.8 16.7 1.5 0.0 
Notes: Table D1 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each 
social appropriateness evaluation in the Age of consent vignette. In each case, the modal 
evaluation is shaded. 
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TABLE D2: APPROPRIATENESS OF SALE IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE: 
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS 
 Very socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very socially 
appropriate 
Panel A: UK Students 
Age of 
youth 
(years, 
months) 
18, 3 2.4 26.2 45.2 26.2 
18, 1 1.7 32.8 39.7 25.9 
17, 11 73.9 23.9 2.2 0.0 
17, 9 82.4 13.7 3.9 0.0 
Panel B: UK General population 
Age of 
youth 
(years, 
months) 
18, 4 20.0 45.0 25.0 10.0 
18, 3 11.6 25.6 30.2 32.6 
18, 2 12.5 33.3 33.3 20.8 
18, 1 11.5 36.1 41.0 11.5 
17, 11 83.0 13.2 1.9 1.9 
17, 10 83.3 9.5 4.8 2.4 
17, 9 72.2 13.9 8.3 5.6 
17, 8 86.5 9.6 3.9 0.0 
Panel C: China Students 
Age of 
youth 
(years, 
months) 
18, 3 3.2 46.0 38.1 12.7 
18, 1 11.7 43.3 31.7 13.3 
17, 11 52.2 34.3 7.5 6.0 
17, 9 62.1 31.0 6.9 0.0 
Notes: Table D2 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each 
social appropriateness evaluation in the Alcohol to youth vignette. In each case, the modal 
evaluation is shaded. 
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TABLE D3: APPROPRIATENESS OF NON-DECLARATION IN CASH AT CUSTOMS 
VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS 
 Very socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very socially 
appropriate 
Panel A: UK Students 
Amount 
imported 
(Euros) 
9,700 2.6 0.0 15.4 82.0 
9,900 0.0 4.2 12.5 83.3 
10,100 5.6 57.4 27.8 9.3 
10,300 12.5 57.1 26.8 3.6 
Panel B: UK General population 
Amount 
imported 
(Euros) 
9,600 10.3 2.6 12.8 74.4 
9,700 9.5 11.9 33.3 45.2 
9,800 4.7 4.7 18.6 72.1 
9,900 3.2 7.9 12.7 76.2 
10,100 14.8 49.2 31.2 4.9 
10,200 17.8 55.6 15.6 11.1 
10,300 18.4 44.7 34.2 2.6 
10,400 18.2 45.5 31.8 4.6 
Panel C: China Students 
Amount 
imported 
(USD) 
4,700 8.6 10.3 10.3 70.7 
4,900 5.0 8.8 17.5 68.8 
5,100 35.9 43.4 17.0 3.8 
5,300 36.8 45.6 15.8 1.8 
Notes: Table D3 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each 
social appropriateness evaluation in the Cash at customs vignette. In each case, the modal 
evaluation is shaded. 
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TABLE D4: APPROPRIATENESS OF DRIVING IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE: 
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS 
 Very socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very socially 
appropriate 
Panel A: UK Students 
Blood 
alcohol 
content 
0.077% 8.2 32.7 42.9 16.3 
0.079% 12.5 31.3 37.5 18.8 
0.081% 18.4 61.2 16.3 4.1 
0.083% 25.5 54.9 17.7 2.0 
Panel B: UK General population 
Blood 
alcohol 
content 
0.076% 21.6 24.3 35.1 18.9 
0.077% 22.6 18.9 28.3 30.2 
0.078% 25.7 20.0 40.0 14.3 
0.079% 15.5 23.9 36.6 23.9 
0.081% 45.3 32.0 16.0 6.7 
0.082% 42.4 42.4 12.1 3.0 
0.083% 50.0 25.0 13.9 11.1 
0.084% 42.9 42.9 8.6 5.7 
Panel C: China Students 
Blood 
alcohol 
content 
0.017% 9.6 30.8 40.4 19.2 
0.019% 13.0 46.8 27.3 13.0 
0.021% 40.9 39.4 16.7 3.0 
0.023% 49.1 43.4 7.6 0.0 
Notes: Table D4 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each 
social appropriateness evaluation in the Drink driving vignette. In each case, the modal 
evaluation is shaded. 
74 
 
TABLE D5: APPROPRIATENESS OF SPEED IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE: 
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS 
 Very socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
inappropriate 
Somewhat 
socially 
appropriate 
Very socially 
appropriate 
Panel A: UK Students 
Speed 
(miles per 
hour) 
67 0.0 1.9 19.2 78.9 
69 0.0 0.0 10.0 90.0 
71 0.0 4.3 42.6 53.2 
73 5.2 31.0 37.9 25.9 
Panel B: UK General population 
Speed 
(miles per 
hour) 
66 4.0 14.0 14.0 68.0 
67 2.7 5.4 29.7 62.2 
68 2.4 11.9 26.2 59.5 
69 0.0 7.8 21.6 70.6 
71 5.1 30.5 42.4 22.0 
72 12.1 39.4 21.2 27.3 
73 14.0 34.0 42.0 10.0 
74 15.1 47.2 24.5 13.2 
Panel C: China Students 
Speed 
(kilometers 
per hour) 
117 4.0 13.3 28.0 54.7 
119 1.9 17.3 34.6 46.2 
121 24.6 49.2 23.0 3.3 
123 23.3 58.3 15.0 3.3 
Notes: Table D5 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each 
social appropriateness evaluation in the Speeding vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is 
shaded. 
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Supplementary Materials E: Regression Output for results in Section 4.2 
 
TABLE E1 –DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VIGNETTES 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Measurability Tolerance Intentionality 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 
0.364*** 
(0.036) 
0.676*** 
(0.040) 
0.085*** 
(0.024) 
𝐴𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 
0.382*** 
(0.035) 
0.623*** 
(0.040) 
0.107*** 
(0.022) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠 
0.235*** 
(0.037) 
0.366*** 
(0.037) 
0.018 
(0.025) 
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 
0.226*** 
(0.031) 
0.567*** 
(0.038) 
0.051* 
(0.026) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.283*** 
(0.068) 
0.103 
(0.083) 
0.624*** 
(0.052) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.078 0.152 0.052 
N.  1,875 1,875 1,875 
Linear restriction tests (raw P-values) 
Drink driving vs Age of consent   <0.001 <0.001 0.146 
Drink driving vs Alcohol to youth <0.001 0.091 0.012 
Drink driving vs Cash at customs 0.783 <0.001 0.176 
Cash at customs vs Age of consent <0.001 <0.001 0.005 
Cash at customs vs Alcohol to youth <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Age of consent vs Alcohol to youth 0.511 0.099 0.312 
Note: Dependent variables are the numerically-transformed responses to the questions asking 
about the degree of measurability of, tolerance towards, and intentionality of illegal behavior. 
The omitted vignette dummy is Speeding. Robust standard errors (with clustering at the 
individual level) in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 
10% significance level. Note that the p-values reported in the main text have been adjusted 
using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method. 
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TABLE E2 – MEASURABILITY 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.026 
(0.037) 
-0.027 
(0.039) 
-0.057 
(0.038) 
-0.019 
(0.042) 
-0.038 
(0.033) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-1.043*** 
(0.133) 
-0.996*** 
(0.121) 
-1.077*** 
(0.134) 
-0.612*** 
(0.153) 
-0.616*** 
(0.153) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.006 
(0.050) 
0.027 
(0.045) 
0.065 
(0.050) 
0.042 
(0.057) 
0.155*** 
(0.049) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
-0.173* 
(0.088) 
-0.087 
(0.094) 
-0.085 
(0.085) 
0.141 
(0.099) 
-0.043 
(0.082) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.417*** 
(0.126) 
0.221* 
(0.124) 
0.309*** 
(0.117) 
0.174 
(0.131) 
0.257* 
(0.133) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.299** 
(0.144) 
0.281** 
(0.126) 
0.605*** 
(0.149) 
-0.097 
(0.158) 
0.655*** 
(0.138) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.485 0.411 0.387 0.188 0.274 
N.  375 375 375 375 375 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a 
vignette. Measurement Error = 0 if subject reports that police can measure illegal behavior 
very accurately, =1 if they do not. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance 
level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
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TABLE E3 – TOLERANCE 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.026 
(0.038) 
-0.031 
(0.039) 
-0.054 
(0.038) 
-0.018 
(0.043) 
-0.036 
(0.033) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.930*** 
(0.142) 
-0.967*** 
(0.125) 
-1.122*** 
(0.143) 
-0.520*** 
(0.157) 
-0.574*** 
(0.178) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.002 
(0.051) 
0.032 
(0.046) 
0.068 
(0.049) 
0.037 
(0.058) 
0.145*** 
(0.049) 
𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
-0.042 
(0.085) 
0.052 
(0.091) 
0.038 
(0.087) 
0.154 
(0.099) 
0.029 
(0.088) 
𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.093 
(0.117) 
0.091 
(0.114) 
0.278** 
(0.123) 
-0.015 
(0.133) 
0.157 
(0.149) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.242 
(0.147) 
0.250** 
(0.126) 
0.566*** 
(0.145) 
-0.115 
(0.162) 
0.627*** 
(0.148) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.468 0.411 0.394 0.170 0.269 
N.  375 375 375 375 375 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a 
vignette. Tolerance = 0 if subject reports that police are very likely to take action against 
person breaking law, =1 if they do not. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% 
significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
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TABLE E4 – INTENTIONALITY 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.027 
(0.038) 
-0.025 
(0.040) 
-0.052 
(0.037) 
-0.015 
(0.043) 
-0.040 
(0.033) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.928*** 
(0.130) 
-0.967*** 
(0.118) 
-1.077*** 
(0.122) 
-0.546*** 
(0.147) 
-0.562*** 
(0.129) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.001 
(0.050) 
0.033 
(0.046) 
0.060 
(0.050) 
0.029 
(0.059) 
0.149*** 
(0.048) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
0.005 
(0.108) 
-0.075 
(0.108) 
-0.347*** 
(0.116) 
0.048 
(0.112) 
-0.232** 
(0.094) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.376** 
(0.185) 
0.545*** 
(0.187) 
0.635*** 
(0.142) 
0.180 
(0.152) 
0.379*** 
(0.126) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.219 
(0.145) 
0.256** 
(0.117) 
0.684*** 
(0.146) 
-0.087 
(0.162) 
0.709*** 
(0.125) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.480 0.427 0.408 0.167 0.280 
N.  375 375 375 375 375 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a 
vignette. Intentionality = 0 if subject reports that avoiding breaking law completely within 
person’s control, =1 if they do not. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% 
significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
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Supplementary Materials F: Replication of analysis of Supplementary Materials E with 
exclusion of data from initial experimental launch 
Note: Small changes were made to the presentation of the follow-up questions after our initial 
experiment launch (N=35), in response to evidence from responses to the open question that 
some subjects were misreading them (see OSM C for more information). Here, we repeat the 
regressions from OSM E, which are behind the analysis of subsection 4.2, after excluding these 
35 subjects. There are only minor changes to the results; intentionality now moderates the effect 
of law on norms at the 10% level in the age of consent vignette and at the 5% level in the alcohol 
to youth vignette; tolerance is no longer a significant moderator even in the cash at customs 
vignette. 
TABLE F1 –DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VIGNETTES 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Measurability Tolerance Intentionality 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 
0.376*** 
(0.037) 
0.683*** 
(0.042) 
0.070*** 
(0.025) 
𝐴𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 
0.392*** 
(0.036) 
0.639*** 
(0.042) 
0.111*** 
(0.023) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠 
0.237*** 
(0.039) 
0.378*** 
(0.038) 
0.014 
(0.027) 
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 
0.219*** 
(0.033) 
0.578*** 
(0.040) 
0.045 
(0.028) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.302*** 
(0.070) 
0.118 
(0.087) 
0.655*** 
(0.051) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.083 0.159 0.053 
N.  1,700 1,700 1,700 
Linear restriction tests (raw P-values) 
Drink driving vs Age of consent   <0.001 0.002 0.302 
Drink driving vs Alcohol to youth <0.001 0.092 0.003 
Drink driving vs Cash at customs 0.615 <0.001 0.236 
Cash at customs vs Age of consent <0.001 <0.001 0.025 
Cash at customs vs Alcohol to youth <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Age of consent vs Alcohol to youth 0.574 0.189 0.050 
Note: Dependent variables are the numerically-transformed responses to the questions asking 
about the degree of measurability of, tolerance towards, and intentionality of illegal behavior. 
The omitted vignette dummy is Speeding. Robust standard errors (with clustering at the 
individual level) in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 
10% significance level. 
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TABLE F2 – MEASURABILITY 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.022 
(0.039) 
-0.029 
(0.041) 
-0.066 
(0.040) 
-0.015 
(0.044) 
-0.058 
(0.035) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-1.083*** 
(0.133) 
-0.980*** 
(0.130) 
-1.097*** 
(0.142) 
-0.654*** 
(0.163) 
-0.613*** 
(0.158) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.001 
(0.050) 
0.031 
(0.048) 
0.070 
(0.052) 
0.021 
(0.061) 
0.191*** 
(0.051) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
-0.161* 
(0.094) 
-0.092 
(0.100) 
-0.083 
(0.093) 
0.153 
(0.104) 
-0.003 
(0.084) 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.374*** 
(0.126) 
0.224* 
(0.134) 
0.308** 
(0.124) 
0.172 
(0.139) 
0.228* 
(0.138) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.355** 
(0.152) 
0.294** 
(0.132) 
0.634*** 
(0.160) 
-0.071 
(0.171) 
0.697*** 
(0.143) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.533 0.400 0.380 0.201 0.292 
N.  340 340 340 340 340 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a 
vignette. Measurement Error = 0 if subject reports that police can measure illegal behavior 
very accurately, =1 if they do not. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% significance 
level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
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TABLE F3 – TOLERANCE 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.022 
(0.041) 
-0.031 
(0.041) 
-0.061 
(0.040) 
-0.016 
(0.045) 
-0.055 
(0.035) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.971*** 
(0.139) 
-0.945*** 
(0.135) 
-1.079*** 
(0.151) 
-0.549*** 
(0.167) 
-0.600*** 
(0.184) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.003 
(0.052) 
0.033 
(0.048) 
0.071 
(0.052) 
0.019 
(0.062) 
0.177*** 
(0.051) 
𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
-0.002 
(0.089) 
0.036 
(0.096) 
0.077 
(0.094) 
0.174 
(0.105) 
0.067 
(0.089) 
𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.050 
(0.113) 
0.089 
(0.121) 
0.185 
(0.130) 
-0.059 
(0.142) 
0.170 
(0.153) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.288* 
(0.155) 
0.264** 
(0.132) 
0.577*** 
(0.156) 
-0.094 
(0.174) 
0.674*** 
(0.151) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.519 0.399 0.382 0.181 0.291 
N.  340 340 340 340 340 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a 
vignette. Tolerance = 0 if subject reports that police are very likely to take action against 
person breaking law, =1 if they do not. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% 
significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
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TABLE F4 – INTENTIONALITY 
OLS regressions, UK general population sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Age of 
consent 
Alcohol     
to youth 
Cash at 
customs 
Drink 
driving 
Speeding 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) 
0.024 
(0.041) 
-0.031 
(0.042) 
-0.059 
(0.040) 
-0.012 
(0.045) 
-0.062 
(0.034) 
𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
-0.981*** 
(0.128) 
-0.951*** 
(0.126) 
-1.084*** 
(0.129) 
-0.592*** 
(0.159) 
-0.574*** 
(0.133) 
(𝑇 − 𝑎𝑖) ∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.002 
(0.051) 
0.040 
(0.048) 
0.060 
(0.052) 
0.009 
(0.063) 
0.184*** 
(0.050) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
0.011 
(0.109) 
-0.006 
(0.119) 
-0.313** 
(0.129) 
-0.001 
(0.118) 
-0.205** 
(0.101) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
0.311* 
(0.180) 
0.526** 
(0.210) 
0.585*** 
(0.154) 
0.147 
(0.168) 
0.367*** 
(0.133) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.283* 
(0.152) 
0.239* 
(0.123) 
0.681*** 
(0.155) 
-0.022 
(0.176) 
0.770*** 
(0.132) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.527 0.418 0.395 0.167 0.295 
N.  340 340 340 340 340 
Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a 
vignette. Intentionality = 0 if subject reports that avoiding breaking law completely within 
person’s control, =1 if they do not. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1% 
significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level. 
 
 
